We analyze optimal monetary policy in a model with two distinct …nancial frictions.
Introduction
In this paper we provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the optimal conduct of monetary policy in the presence of …nancial frictions. Both optimal monetary policy and the macroeconomic e¤ects of …nancial frictions have attracted much attention in recent times. However, much less e¤ort has been devoted to exploring the connections between both …elds in the context of modern dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
Here we perform such an exploration in the framework of a model economy featuring two distinct …nancial frictions: collateral constraints and endogenous bank-lending spreads. In this way, our setup addresses two of the most prominent hypotheses in the macroeconomic literature on …nancial frictions: one that emphasizes the role of endogenous collateral constraints and ‡uctuations in asset prices (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Iacoviello, 2005) , and another one that stresses the role of endogenous lending spreads, as exempli…ed by the "…nancial accelerator" literature (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999) and by the recent literature on banking and macroeconomics (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007) .
Speci…cally, we consider an economy in which consumers are divided into households and entrepreneurs, where the former are assumed to be relatively more patient and therefore act as savers. Entrepreneurs face credit constraints that limit their borrowing capacity to a certain fraction (the pledgeability ratio) of the expected value of their real estate holdings, which are assumed to be the only collateralizable asset. Real estate can also be used by entrepreneurs as commercial property for production purposes, and by households in the form of residential property. Unlike in most of the literature, savers do not lend directly to borrowers. Instead, they provide banks with deposits that are then used to make loans to entrepreneurs. Banks are assumed to have some monopolistic power in the loans market. In particular, following Andrés and Arce (2008) we assume that a …xed number of identical banks compete to attract investors as in the spatial competition model of Salop (1979) . In this framework, each bank is able to charge a positive lending spread on the deposit rate. In equilibrium, lending spreads depend negatively on the expected evolution of real estate prices, the pledgeability ratio and the degree of banking competition, and positively on the policy rate, due to their respective e¤ects on the elasticity of demand for collateralized loans. Finally, our economy features two familiar nominal frictions: nominal (non-state-contingent) debt and staggered nominal price adjustment à la Calvo (1983) , both of which open two additional channels of in ‡uence for monetary policy.
Our main objective is to understand the nature of optimal monetary policy in this framework. With this aim we follow the welfare-based linear-quadratic approach pioneered by Rotem-berg and Woodford (1997) . 1 The central bank's optimal monetary policy commitment is the one that maximizes the quadratic approximation of the welfare criterion subject to the linear approximation of the equilibrium constraints. We …rst show that the central bank's quadratic welfare criterion features four stabilization goals: in ‡ation, the output gap, the di¤erence in consumption between households and entrepreneurs (or consumption gap) and the ine¢ ciency in the distribution of real estate between both groups (or housing gap). The …rst two, in ‡ation and the output gap, are related to the existence of staggered price adjustment and are therefore standard in the New Keynesian literature. The last two are novel and are directly related to the existence of …nancial frictions. Regarding the consumption gap, collateral constraints prevent constrained consumers from smoothing their consumption the way unconstrained consumers do. 2 This gives rise to ine¢ cient risk sharing between both consumer types. Regarding the housing gap, the distribution of real estate between both groups will generally be ine¢ cient, because entrepreneurs'demand for real estate is distorted by its role as collateral. We then use the linear equilibrium constraints to illustrate some of the trade-o¤s among stabilization goals. Our analysis reveals that the presence of collateral constraints makes it impossible for the central bank to stabilize all four goals simultaneously. 3 Therefore, the optimal policy commitment must yield a compromise between stabilization goals. In order to illustrate the nature of optimal monetary policy, we calibrate our model economy and simulate the e¤ects of a fall in TFP, as an example of non-…nancial shock, and a fall in the pledgeability ratio, as an example of …nancial shock. The latter represents a tightening of borrowing constraints, and can be thus interpreted as a credit crunch. In both cases, and relative to a simple policy of strict in ‡ation targeting, we …nd that the optimal policy engineers a sharper cut in the policy rate, which banks pass on to nominal loan rates. This contains the fall in investment in commercial real estate (hence narrowing the housing gap) and in real estate prices. This results in an improvement in entrepreneur net worth which, in turn, narrows the consumption gap. The more aggressive policy response comes at the cost of generating temporary increases in in ‡ation and the output gap, but these are very short-lived thanks to the improved output-in ‡ation trade-o¤ allowed for by the smaller consumption gap. Intuitively, by reacting rapidly and aggressively under the optimal rule, the central bank tries to avoid a large initial fall in entrepreneurs'net wealth, the e¤ects of which are very persistent due to the presence of borrowing constraints.
We also look for a simple and robust targeting rule that approximates well the optimal policy. In searching for such a simple rule, we …rst note that in our model the price of the collateralizable asset (real estate) has an important e¤ect on the transmission of shocks. On the one hand, entrepreneurs'expenditure decisions are very sensitive to current ‡uctuations in real estate prices, due to their e¤ect on their current net worth. On the other hand, expected changes in real estate prices have a potentially important e¤ect on equilibrium lending margins, through their e¤ect on the elasticity of demand for loans. The previous argument suggests considering simple targeting rules that capture the central bank's concern for stabilizing the actual and expected evolution of asset prices, together with the usual concern for in ‡ation stabilization. In particular, we …nd that a simple targeting rule that relates current in ‡ation negatively with current and one-period ahead expected changes in real estate prices performs fairly well in the face of both …nancial and non-…nancial shocks, in the sense that the implied welfare losses are close to those obtained under the optimal policy. This analysis suggests that, to the extent that ‡uctuations in the price of collateralizable assets cause large distortions in the consumption and investment decisions of constrained agents, then the monetary authority has a rationale for taking into account such asset price ‡uctuations in its policy decisions.
Finally, we are interested in understanding how the degree of banking competition a¤ects the severity of the trade-o¤s just discussed. With this purpose, we consider a counter-factual scenario in which the banking sector becomes perfectly competitive, and then compare the associated welfare losses in this and our baseline scenario. We …nd that welfare losses are higher with perfect banking competition, both under the optimal commitment and (especially) under suboptimal policy rules, such as in ‡ation or output-gap targeting. The reason is that, as lending spreads fall, entrepreneurs become more leveraged. This makes their net worth more sensitive to ‡uctuations in real estate prices, which in turn ampli…es ‡uctuations in the consumption and housing gaps. This mechanism operates regardless of the nature of shocks. However, in the case of …nancial shocks it is counteracted by an opposing force. When banks have maket power, exogenous variations in the pledgeability ratio have a direct countercyclical e¤ect on lending margins. Under perfect competition, lending margins become zero, and so the amplifying e¤ect of their counter-cyclical response disappears.
Our analysis is related to recent work by Cúrdia and Woodford (2008; CW, for short), who focus on the design of optimal monetary policy rules in a model in which a positive spread exists between lending and deposit rates. CW assume that the lending spread is determined by an adhoc function of banks'loan volume, aimed at capturing the costs of originating and monitoring loans. We di¤er from CW in two important respects regarding the nature of credit frictions. First, we model credit spreads as arising endogenously in an environment in which banks enjoy some monopolistic power in the loans market. Second, we subject borrowers to endogenous collateral constraints. As in CW, we cast our optimal policy problem in a linear-quadratic representation, motivated by its potential for delivering analytical results. Importantly, both CW and we …nd that cyclical ‡uctuations in lending spreads have small quantitative e¤ects on the nature of optimal monetary policy design. However, in our model the average level of lending spreads has non-negligible e¤ects that arise from the interaction between spreads and collateral constraints, a channel which is missing in CW.
Also related is the work of Monacelli (2007) , who analyzes the Ramsey optimal monetary policy in a model with collateral constraints and quadratic price adjustment costs. He …nds a trade-o¤ between stabilizing in ‡ation and relaxing collateral constraints. In addition to collateral constraints, our model also incorporates a monopolistically competitive banking sector, which gives rise to endogenous lending margins. Also, we follow the linear-quadratic approach to monetary policy analysis, which allows us to obtain intuitive expressions for the central bank's stabilization goals and trade-o¤s. De Fiore, Teles and Tristani (2009) explore optimal monetary rules in a model where …rms'assets and liabilities are denominated in nominal terms and predetermined. Our model also incorporates predetermined nominal debt that, as in their model, works to amplify or dampen shocks. However, our focus is rather on the consequences of other forms of …nancial frictions, especially collateral constraints and endogenous lending spreads, for the optimal conduct of monetary policy. Finally, De Fiore and Tristani (2009) have recently explored optimal monetary policy in an environment where lending spreads are the result of costly state veri…cation problems, as in the …nancial accelerator theory in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the e¢ cient equilibrium, which provides a helpful normative benchmark. In section 4, we derive the central bank's quadratic welfare criterion and discuss some of the trade-o¤s among stabilization goals. In section 5 we calibrate our model and perform a number of quantitative exercises, in order to illustrate the working of optimal and suboptimal monetary rules. Section 6 concludes.
Model
In this section we describe a model economy that relies on Iacoviello (2005) and Andrés and Arce (2008) . The population of consumers, whose size is normalized to 1, is composed of two types of agents: there is a fraction ! of households and a fraction 1 ! of entrepreneurs. The latter are assumed to be more impatient than the former. This produces credit ‡ows between both groups which are intermediated by monopolistically competitive banks. A sector of monopolistic …nal goods producers transforms the homogenous intermediate good produced by the entrepreneurs into di¤erentiated …nal goods, which are then sold to consumers. We now analyze the problem of each type of agent.
Households
The representative household maximizes the following welfare criterion,
where c t are units of a Dixit-Stiglitz basket of …nal consumption goods, l s t is labor supply, h t are units of housing, # t = # exp(z h t ) is an exogenously time-varying weight on utility from housing services (where z h t follows a zero-mean AR(1) process) and 2 (0; 1) is the household's subjective discount factor. Maximization is subject to the following budget constraint expressed in real terms,
where w t is the hourly wage, b t and f t are lump-sum nominal pro…ts from the banking and …nal goods sectors, respectively, and s t are lump-sum subsidies from the government. We assume that nominal, risk-free, one-period bank deposits are the only …nancial asset available to households, where d t is the real value of deposits at the end of period t, R D t is the gross nominal deposit rate and t P t =P t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate, where P t is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price index. Households can also buy and sell real estate at a unit price p h t (measured in terms of consumption goods). End-of-period housing wealth is taxed at the rate h (the role of which is discussed later on). We assume that real estate does not depreciate. The …rst order conditions of this problem can be expressed as
Entrepreneurs (intermediate good producers)
Entrepreneurs produce a homogenous intermediate good that is sold under perfect competition to a …nal goods sector. They operate a Cobb-Douglas production technology,
where y t is output of the intermediate good, l d t is labor demand, h e t 1 is the stock of commercial real estate and a t is a zero-mean AR(1) exogenous productivity process. Entrepreneurs also demand consumption goods and loans. The budget constraint of the representative entrepreneur is given by
where b t is the real value of one-period nominal loans at the end of period t, R L t is the gross nominal loan rate, p I t is the real price of the intermediate good,
e is a tax rate on entrepreneur pro…ts (the role of which is explained below) and c e t is entrepreneur consumption. Banks impose a collateral constraint on entrepreneurs: the nominal loan gross of interest payments cannot exceed a certain fraction (the pledgeability ratio) of the expected nominal resale value of the entrepreneur's real estate holdings. The collateral constraint can be expressed in real terms as,
where m t = m exp(z m t ) is the exogenously time-varying pledgeability ratio and z m t is a zeromean AR(1) process. In order to obtain a loan, the entrepreneur must …rst travel to a bank, incurring a utility cost which is proportional to the distance between hers and the bank's location. We assume that entrepreneurs and banks are uniformly distributed on a circle of length one. Subject to (4), (5) and (6) , an entrepreneur located at point k 2 (0; 1] maximizes
where d k;i t is the distance between the entrepreneur and the lending bank (denoted by i), and is the utility cost per distance unit. 4 Entrepreneurs are assumed to be more impatient than savers: e < . The …rst order conditions of this problem are
1 c
(1 e ) p I t+1
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint and p I t y t =h e t 1 is the marginal revenue product of commercial real estate. When binding ( t > 0), the collateral constraint has two e¤ects on the entrepreneur's decisions: …rst, it prevents them from smoothing their consumption the way households do (equation 8); second, it increases the marginal value of real estate due to its role as collateral (equation 9).
Equations (8) and (2) ; which holds under our subsequent calibration. Provided that the ‡uctuations in the relevant variables around their steady state are su¢ ciently small, the borrowing constraint will also bind along the dynamics; that is, equation (6) will hold with equality. In that case, it is possible to show that entrepreneur consumption equals
That is, the entrepreneur always consumes a fraction 1 e of her real net worth, which is the sum of after-tax real pro…ts, (1 e ) p 4 This simple device is meant to motivate the existence of some monopoly power on the part of banks. See Andrés and Arce (2008) for a discussion on the foundations of this assumption. 5 See the proof in the Appendix.
Banks
Banks are assumed to intermediate all credit ‡ows between households (savers) and entrepreneurs (borrowers). We assume that banks are perfectly competitive on the deposits market, and so they take as given the nominal deposit rate, R D t , which is set by the central bank. However, competition in the loans market is imperfect, so that each bank enjoys some monopolistic power. In order to model imperfect competition in the loans market we use a version of Salop's (1979) circular-city model. A discrete number n of banks are located symmetrically on the unit circle and their position is time-invariant, whereas entrepreneurs' locations vary each period according to an iid stochastic process. 6 Bank i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng chooses the gross nominal interest rate on its loans, R L t (i), to maximize
where s c t =c t+s is the time t + s stochastic discount factor of the households (who are assumed to own the banks) and t+s (i) is the bank's nominal pro…t ‡ow. Denoting by B t (i) and D t (i) the nominal stock of loans and deposits of bank i at the end of time t; respectively, we can write its ‡ow of funds constraint as
Further, bank i must also obey the balance-sheet identity, D t (i) = B t (i). This implies that period t nominal pro…ts are simply
To solve for the bank's optimal loan rate, it is convenient to express its loan volume in real terms as
where b t (i) is the intensive business margin (the size of each loan) andb t (i) is the extensive business margin (the number of customers, or market share). 7 The …rst order condition of this problem can be written as
6 This last assumption removes the possibility that banks exploit strategically the knowledge about the current position of each entrepreneur to charge higher rates in the future. 7 See Andrés and Arce (2008) for analytical derivations of both margins.
where t (i)
are the semi-elasticities of the intensive and the extensive business margins, respectively. Thus the spread between the lending and the deposit rate is a negative function of the bank's market power, as measured by the semi-elasticities of individual loan size and market share.
As shown in Andrés and Arce (2008), in a symmetric equilibrium
, the optimal nominal loan rate can be expressed as
where
Therefore, the lending spread is decreasing in expected nominal house price in ‡ation, E t t+1 p h t+1 =p h t , the pledgeability ratio, m t , and the degree of banking competition, as captured by the ratio n= ; and it is increasing in the nominal deposit rate, R D t . The intuition for these e¤ects is the following. An increase in expected house price in ‡ation or in the pledgeability ratio increase entrepreneurs'borrowing capacity. As their indebtedness rises, their demand for loans becomes more elastic, which reduces banks' market power and compresses lending spreads. Similarly, as entrepreneurs become more indebted, the utility cost of servicing the debt becomes more important in the choice of bank relative to the distance utility cost. As a result, small changes in loan rates lead to large ‡ows of customers in search for the lowest loan rate. This reduces the elasticity of the extensive business margin and hence pushes lending spreads down. Similar intuitions can be provided regarding the e¤ects of the nominal deposit rate. Finally, an increase in the degree of banking competition (i.e. a rise in n= ) compresses lending spreads through an increase in the elasticity of banks'market share with respect to the lending rate.
In the symmetric equilibrium, each bank hasb t (i) = (1 !) =n customers and each loan equals b t (i) = b t in real terms, for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng. Therefore, aggregate real pro…ts in the banking sector equal
Final goods producers
There exist a measure-one continuum of …rms that purchase the intermediate good from entrepreneurs and transform it one-for-one into di¤erentiated …nal good varieties. For these …rms, the real price of the intermediate good, p for its product variety,
where P t (j) is the …rm's nominal price, " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between …nal good varieties and
is the aggregate demand for …nal goods. As is standard in the New Keynesian literature, we assume staggered nominal price adjustment à la Calvo (1983) . Letting denote the constant probability of non-adjustment, the optimal price decision of price-setting …rms is given by
where > 0 is a subsidy rate on the revenue of …nal goods producers (the role of which is explained below) andP t is the optimal price decision. Under Calvo price adjustment, the aggregate price index evolves as follows,
Aggregate nominal pro…ts in the …nal goods sector equal
Market clearing
Total supply of the intermediate good equals (1 !) y t . Total demand from …nal good producers equals
where each …rm's demand is given by (13) . Equilibrium in the intermediate good market therefore requires
" dj is a measure of price dispersion in …nal goods. Notice that price dispersion increases the amount of the intermediate good that must be produced in order to satisfy a certain level of …nal consumption demand. Equilibrium in the real estate market requires
where h is the …xed aggregate stock of real estate. The labor market equilibrium condition is
Fiscal and monetary authorities
The …scal authority passively rebates its ‡ow surplus to households in a lump-sum manner (if such surplus is negative, then it represents a lump-sum tax). Letting s t denote the surplus per household, the aggregate …scal surplus equals
The model is closed by means of a monetary policy rule. The latter can be a simple rule, such as strict in ‡ation targeting, or a policy that is optimal with respect to some criterion. Sections 4 and 5 below are devoted to characterizing di¤erent types of policy rules and their e¤ects on equilibrium allocations.
E¢ cient equilibrium
In this section we analyze the e¢ cient equilibrium in our model, which will be the normative benchmark for the monetary authority. We assume that, when maximizing aggregate welfare, the social planner assigns to entrepreneurs the same discount factor as that of households, . 8 The social planner therefore maximizes
) subject to the aggregate resource constraints for real estate, equation (18), and for consumption goods,
where we have used equation (19) to substitute for l d t in the production function. Using equations (20) and (18) to solve for c t and h t , respectively, the social-planner problem simpli…es to the choice of the optimal state-contingent path of c 
Notice that equations (20) and (21) jointly imply c t = (1 !) e at h
Using this in equation (22), we have that the e¢ cient distribution of the stock of real estate is given by h
This, combined with equation (18), implies the following solution for aggregate housing,
Using equations (20) and (21) in equation (23), we obtain the following solution for e¢ cient labor supply,
The e¢ cient level of output is then given by
To summarize, the e¢ cient equilibrium is characterized by full consumption risk sharing between households and entrepreneurs (equation 21), a distribution of real estate that changes only with shocks to preferences for housing (equation 24) and a constant level of labor supply (equation 26). 9 These features will help us understand the stabilization goals and trade-o¤s of monetary policy. We turn to this now. 9 The fact that neither labor hours nor the distribution of real estate are a¤ected by productivity shocks in the e¢ cient equilibrium is due to our assumption of logarithmic utility of consumption. Deviating from the latter assumption would complicate the algebra without adding much to our main insights about the nature of optimal monetary policy.
Optimal monetary policy
In order to analyze optimal monetary policy, we follow the welfare-based linear-quadratic approach pioneered by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . This method consists of deriving a log-quadratic approximation of aggregate welfare (which represents the objective function of the central bank) and a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions (which are the constraints on the central bank's optimization problem). As is well known, this method is helpful at clarifying the stabilization goals faced by the central bank and the various tradeo¤s among those goals. Indeed, the application of this method in our setup delivers a set of analytical results that facilitate greatly the interpretation of the subsequent numerical results.
Quadratic loss function
As emphasized by Benigno and Woodford (2008) , the approximation of the aggregate welfare criterion must be purely quadratic in order for the linear-quadratic approach to provide a correct welfare ranking (with an accuracy of up to second order) of alternative monetary policy rules. Derivation of a purely quadratic approximation is greatly simpli…ed by the assumption of an e¢ cient steady state for the welfare-relevant variables. As shown in the Appendix, steady-state e¢ ciency for such variables can be implemented in our framework by making the following three assumptions.
Assumption 1
The subsidy rate on the revenue of …nal goods producers is given by
Assumption 2 The tax rate on entrepreneur pro…ts is given by
Assumption 3 The tax rate on housing wealth is given by
L ss
The …rst assumption eliminates the monopolistic distortion in …nal goods markets, such that steady-state real marginal costs are unity (p 
where t:i:p: are terms independent of policy, O 3 are terms of order third and higher, and
is a purely quadratic period loss function, where hats denote log-deviations from steady state and weight coe¢ cients are given by
The loss function illustrates the existence of four stabilization goals for the central bank. The …rst one is in ‡ation. As is well known, under staggered price adjustment in ‡ation creates ine¢ cient price dispersion and hence a welfare loss. The second goal is the output gap, which is the di¤erence between the actual and the e¢ cient level of output. The latter is de…ned aŝ
which is simply the log-linear version of equation (27) . Nominal price rigidities produce inef…cient ‡uctuations in output, which generates in turn ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in labor hours. These …rst two goals are standard in the New Keynesian model. The third and fourth goals are directly related to the existence of …nancial frictions in this model. The third goal is the (log)di¤erence in per capita consumption between households and entrepreneurs, i.e. between unconstrained and constrained consumers, which we may refer to as the consumption gap. This term captures the aggregate welfare losses produced by ine¢ cient risk sharing between households and entrepreneurs, which is in turn the result of collateral constraints on entrepreneurs. The fourth goal is the (log)di¤erence between the actual and the e¢ cient level of housing, or housing gap, wherê
is e¢ cient housing (see equation 25). Notice that, given the …xed supply of real estate, an ine¢ cient level of housing is equivalent to an ine¢ cient distribution of real estate between residential and commercial uses. In our framework, ine¢ ciency in the real estate distribution can arise for two reasons. First, the demand for commercial property by entrepreneurs is distorted by its role as collateral in loan agreements. Second, since households and entrepreneurs di¤er in their degree of impatience and their consumption, they also use di¤erent stochastic discount factors for pricing future state-contingent payo¤s from housing.
Policy trade-o¤s
The second step of the linear-quadratic approach consists of log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions around the steady state. For brevity, the complete list of log-linear equations is deferred to the Appendix. 11 Here, we restrict our attention to those equations that are helpful for understanding the trade-o¤s among stabilization goals. We start by log-linearizing and combining equations (15) and (16) , which yieldŝ
In order to …nd an expression for the real marginal cost,p I t , we …rst log-linearize equations (1), (7) and (19) , and combine them to get
That is, the labor supply schedule (the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure) must intersect the labor demand schedule (the marginal revenue product of labor). 11 Simulation results not reported here indicate that the Ramsey optimal long-run gross rate of in ‡ation is ss = 1, regardless of whether the steady state is assumed to be e¢ cient or not. Therefore, our log-linearization is performed around a zero net in ‡ation steady state. The reason for this result is essentially the same as the reason why the optimal long-run net rate of in ‡ation is zero in the standard New Keynesian model, namely that the welfare losses of committing to positive in ‡ation rates in the future outweigh the welfare gains of exploiting the short-run output-in ‡ation trade-o¤ when output is ine¢ ciently low (see e.g. Woodford, 2003, ch. 6 ).
Second, we log-linearize the production function and solve for labor hours, obtaininĝ
where in the second equality we have used the de…nition of e¢ cient output. Third, we loglinearize the equilibrium conditions in the …nal goods and intermediate good markets, equations (14) and (17) respectively, and combine them intô
where we have used the fact that (1 !) y ss = c ss = c e ss and that^ t is actually a second-order term (see the appendix). Combining equations (31) to (33), we can express real marginal costs asp
Using this in equation (30) yields the following New Keynesian Phillips curve,
where (1 ) (1 ) = . Equation (35) has the same form as the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, with the exception of the last term on the right hand side, which is proportional to the consumption gap. Therefore, collateral constraints and the resulting ine¢ cient risksharing create an endogenous trade-o¤ between the output gap and in ‡ation. The reason is the following. From equation (31), real marginal costsp I t depend on labor hours and the di¤erence between aggregate demand and household consumption. Because of ine¢ cient risk sharing, ‡uctuations in aggregate demand and household consumption will be unequal. As a result, keeping labor hours constant (that is, closing the output gap) is not enough to prevent ‡uctuations in real marginal costs and hence in in ‡ation.
From the preceding analysis, it follows that closing the consumption gap has several bene…cial e¤ects on aggregate welfare. First, it improves the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output gap. Second, since the consumption gap is itself a stabilization goal, closing it directly improves welfare. An additional normative reason for closing the consumption gap is that it reduces the distortionary e¤ects of collateral constraints on entrepreneurs' stochastic discount factor and hence on their valuation of future income streams from commercial property. This makes the real estate distribution more e¢ cient over the cycle and thus helps closing the housing gap.
While desirable, consumption gap stabilization requires itself ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in other stabilization goals. To see this, consider the log-linear approximation of the expression for entrepreneur consumption (equation 10) around the e¢ cient steady state,
Therefore, entrepreneur pro…ts (p I t +ŷ t ), quasi-surprises in real estate prices (p h t mE t 1p h t ), the stock of commercial property (ĥ e t 1 ) and in ‡ation surprises (^ t E t 1^ t ) are the endogenous determinants of entrepreneur consumption. The latter will therefore di¤er from household consumption, which is driven exclusively by intertemporal substitution considerations. In response to unexpected shocks, it is however possible for the central bank to bring entrepreneur and household consumption closer to each other. First, the central bank can use its interest rate policy to indirectly a¤ect the path of real estate wealth. Second, it can engineer in ‡ation surprises so as to alter the real value of debt repayments. Third, notice that entrepreneur pro…ts can be expressed in terms of stabilization goals as follows,
where we have used equation (34) to substitute forp I t . Therefore, the central bank can also a¤ect the output-gap in order to narrow the consumption gap.
To summarize, optimal monetary policy will involve a trade-o¤ between all four stabilization goals in response to macroeconomic shocks. We now turn to the quantitative analysis of these trade-o¤s.
Quantitative analysis

Calibration
We calibrate our model to quarterly US data. The calibration is largely based on Andrés and Arce (2008) and Iacoviello (2005) . The household discount factor, = 0:993, is chosen such that the annual real interest rate equals 3%. The entrepreneur discount factor is set to 0:95, within the range of values for constrained consumers typically used in the literature. The elasticity of production with respect to commercial housing, , is set to generate a steady-state ratio of commercial real estate wealth to annual output of 62%. Similarly, the weight on housing utility, #, is chosen to match an average ratio of housing wealth to annual output of 140%. Regarding the banking parameters, what matters for the steady-state level of lending spreads is the ratio n= . We arbitrarily set the number of banks to 10, and then set the distance utility parameter, , to obtain a steady-state annualized lending spread of 2:5%. The size of the household population, ! = 0:979, is chosen such that the tax rate on entrepreneur pro…ts that implements the e¢ cient steady state is zero. 12 The loan-to-value ratio is set to m = 0:85, as in Iacoviello (2005) . The labor supply elasticity is set to one half, which is broadly consistent with micro evidence. The elasticity of demand curves is set to 6, which would imply a monopolistic mark-up of 20% in the absence of subsidies. The Calvo parameter implies a mean duration of price contracts of 3 quarters, consistent with recent micro evidence (Bils and Klenow, 2004, Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). The tax rate on housing wealth that implements the e¢ cient steady state is h = 0:012. The structural parameters imply weights (normalized by their sum) of = 91:2%, y = 7:9%, c = 0:1% and h = 0:8% in the loss function. Finally, the autocorrelation coe¢ cient of a t is set to a standard value of 0.95, whereas that of z m t is set to 0.75, implying a half-life of four quarters for shocks to the pledgeability ratio. 0.67 1=(1 ) = 3 qrts.
Calvo parameter
Impulse-response analysis
In order to further investigate the nature of optimal monetary policy in this framework, we now analyze the economy's response to shocks under the optimal commitment. We consider both productivity shocks as well as credit-crunch shocks, the latter in the form of shocks to the pledgeability ratio. 13 We also analyze the impulse-responses under a policy of strict in ‡ation targeting (^ t = 0). Such a policy has been shown to be optimal in the standard New Keynesian model (see e.g. King, 2001, and Woodford, 2003) . By comparing both policies, we can illustrate the trade-o¤s that render in ‡ation targeting suboptimal in this framework. Figure 1 plots the economy's response to a 1% negative productivity shock. Let us focus …rst on the case of strict in ‡ation targeting (dotted lines). The fall in total factor productivity reduces the marginal product of commercial real estate. Entrepreneurs respond by reducing their demand for commercial property, which leads to a persistent decline in real estate prices. Lower expected asset prices means that real estate is less valuable as a collateral, which further reduces demand for commercial real estate. Since productivity shocks do not a¤ect the e¢ cient real estate distribution, the fall in commercial property is mirrored by a symmetric increase in the housing gap. Also, lower pro…ts and lower real estate wealth trigger a large reduction in entrepreneur net worth and therefore in entrepreneur consumption. Household consumption falls too, but it does so by a relatively small amount, thanks to households'better ability to smooth consumption. As a result, the consumption gap increases sharply on impact. In addition to lowering welfare directly, the consumption gap also shifts the New Keynesian Phillips curve upwards. In order to keep in ‡ation at zero, the central bank is obliged to engineer a (small) drop in the output gap. To summarize, strict in ‡ation targeting requires ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in the output gap and, especially, in the consumption and housing gaps.
Productivity shocks
FIGURE 1 HERE
Relative to the situation under in ‡ation targeting, the optimal policy (solid line) can improve matters by cutting the nominal interest rate more sharply on impact. This way, it undoes part of the reduction in entrepreneurs'demand for commercial real estate, thus narrowing the housing gap. Thanks to the smaller drop in real estate prices and in commercial property, entrepreneurs' net worth and consumption fall substantially less, which produces a signi…cant reduction in the consumption gap. Notice that the more aggressive policy response leads to an increase in the output gap and in ‡ation on impact. This lowers welfare directly, but it also helps at reducing the consumption gap, by increasing entrepreneur pro…ts and reducing their real debt burden. Calculations not reported here show however that most of the reduction in the consumption gap is due to the smaller drop in real estate wealth. The contraction in the consumption gap contains the upward shift in the New Keynesian Phillips curve, thus improving the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output gap. Indeed, both variables return to zero very quickly. Finally, the endogenous response in lending spreads (not shown in the …gure) is very small under both policy regimes, with peak drops of 1 and 0:2 basis points, respectively. The reason is that the reaction of the two endogenous determinants of lending spreads (expected in ‡ation in real estate prices, and the policy rate) tend to cancel each other out. 14 Figure 2 plots the impulse-responses to a 1% negative shock to the pledgeability ratio. Again, we focus …rst on the case of in ‡ation targeting (dotted lines). The fall in the pledgeability ratio reduces the marginal value of commercial real estate by reducing its value as collateral. Entrepreneurs respond by decreasing their demand for commercial real estate. This produces again a symmetric increase in the housing gap, because the e¢ cient real estate distribution is independent of the pledgeability ratio. Regarding the other stabilization goals, the responses are of minor importance. First, the absolute deviations of the consumption gap from its e¢ cient value (zero) are much smaller than in the case of a productivity shock. The reason is that the credit crunch has two opposing e¤ects on entrepreneur net worth. On the one hand, the fall in the price and the quantity of real estate reduces entrepreneurial net worth but, on the other hand, the credit crunch lowers their real debt burden in subsequent periods, thus improving their net worth (as the center right panel shows, the latter e¤ect becomes dominant from the third period onwards). Second, since what matters for in ‡ation dynamics is the presentdiscounted sum of consumption gaps and the latter sum responds relatively little, the shift in the New Keynesian Phillips curve is small, such that a tiny fall in the output gap is enough to keep in ‡ation at zero.
Credit crunch shocks
FIGURE 2 HERE
Therefore, the optimal policy (solid lines) is primarily aimed at reducing the housing gap. In order to achieve this, the monetary authority resorts again to a sharper reduction in the policy rate. This way, it counteracts the negative e¤ect of the credit crunch on entrepreneurs' demand for commercial property. As in the case of productivity shocks, this policy comes at the cost of increases in in ‡ation and the output gap on impact, followed by transitory negative deviations from their e¢ cient levels (zero). Notice …nally that lending margins experience a non-negligible impact increase of 15 basis points in annualized terms (lower left panel), which contrasts with their negligible response to productivity shocks. This is due to the fact that lending margins depend negatively on the pledgeability ratio, through the latter's e¤ect on the elasticity of demand for funding. This countercyclical response of lending margins has the property of amplifying the negative e¤ect of the credit crunch under both policy scenarios.
Welfare analysis
The previous section characterized the responses of the stabilization goals to productivity and credit-crunch shocks. These goals however enter with di¤erent weights in the loss function of the central bank, and therefore have di¤erent quantitative e¤ects on welfare. We are ultimately concerned with the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy rules. This subsection quanti…es the welfare losses that arise under di¤erent such rules.
Welfare losses under the baseline calibration
The …rst four columns of Table 2 display the standard deviation of the four stabilization goals, conditional on productivity shocks (with a standard deviation of 1%). As in the analysis of impulse responses, we consider the cases of in ‡ation targeting and the optimal policy commitment. We also include output gap targeting (ŷ t =ŷ t ), which is equivalent to in ‡ation targeting in the standard New Keynesian model (in the absence of an exogenous output-in ‡ation trade-o¤) but not in our framework, due to the presence of the consumption gap in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The last column displays the implied average welfare loss, as a percent of steady-state consumption. Note: standard deviations in %, welfare loss as a % of steady-state consumption ** optimal weight: = 0:212
As the table makes clear, a policy of strict in ‡ation targeting implies large ‡uctuations in the consumption and housing gaps. Fluctuations in the output gap are rather small. These volatilities, together with the weights in the loss function, imply an average welfare loss of 0:11% of steady-state consumption. Regarding the case of output gap targeting, ‡uctuations in the consumption and housing gaps are of similar magnitude, whereas (annualized) in ‡ation has a standard deviation of 85 basis points. The implied average welfare loss (0:09%) is close to the one under in ‡ation targeting. Finally, the optimal monetary policy balances all the trade-o¤s among goals, producing a welfare loss of just 0:03% of steady-state consumption. Table 3 shows the standard deviation of the stabilization goals and the implied average welfare losses, conditional on shocks to the pledgeability ratio (with a standard deviation of 1%). Again, the larger ‡uctuations take place in the consumption and housing gaps. Under in ‡ation and output-gap targeting, housing gaps are more volatile than consumption gaps. Since the former have a larger weight in the loss function, the optimal policy focuses on reducing ‡uctuations in the housing gap. This comes at the cost of larger ‡uctuations in all other goals. Intuitively, exogenous changes in the pledgeability ratio directly a¤ect both the value of real estate as collateral and the lending margins charged to entrepreneurs; as a result, the policy of sustaining demand for commercial real estate becomes less e¤ective and hence more costly in terms of the other goals. This implies that, in terms of average welfare losses, in ‡ation and output-gap targeting are much closer to the optimal policy than in the case of productivity shocks. Note: standard deviations in %, welfare loss as a % of steady-state consumption ** optimal weight: = 0:262
Optimal simple targeting rules
In the standard New Keynesian model without an exogenous trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output (the so-called "cost-push" shocks), the targeting rule that implements the optimal monetary policy commitment is simply^ t = 0, that is, strict in ‡ation targeting. In the presence of cost-push shocks, the corresponding targeting rule is a simple and intuitive expression linking in ‡ation and the output gap (see e.g. Woodford 2003, ch. 7). In our model, due to its larger scale and the presence of …nancial frictions, the optimal targeting rule is too complex to be implemented in practice. In order to make the optimal monetary policy operational, we look for a simple targeting rule that approximates well the optimal policy. An important feature of our analysis is that the real price of the collateralizable asset (in our case, real estate) has an important e¤ect on the transmission of shocks to the economy. On the one hand, consumption of the constrained agents is very sensitive to ‡uctuations in real estate wealth, and hence in real estate prices. On the other hand, the expected evolution of real estate prices has a potentially important e¤ect on equilibrium lending margins, through their e¤ect on the elasticity of demand for loans. In response to an adverse shock that persistently depresses real estate prices, both e¤ects work towards amplifying the negative e¤ects of the shock: actual reductions in asset prices lower entrepreneurial net worth and thus widen the consumption gap, whereas expected reductions in the latter prices cause countercyclical increases in lending margins. The previous argument suggests considering simple targeting rules that capture the central bank's concern for stabilizing the actual and expected evolution of asset prices, together with the usual concern for in ‡ation stabilization. In particular, we consider the following family of simple targeting rules,^
According to this rule, the central bank targets a weighted average of in ‡ation, on the one hand, and the sum of current and expected growth rates in the real price of real estate, on the other. 15 In the special case of = 0, the rule collapses to strict in ‡ation targeting. For each shock, we …nd the value of that minimizes the average welfare loss. The last line of tables 2 and 3 display the results under our proposed rule, which is labelled as 'simple targeting rule'. Notice …rst that the optimal coe¢ cient is positive conditional on either type of shock. The intuition is simple. Following for instance adverse shocks (…nancial or non-…nancial), strict in ‡ation targeting produces an excessively large fall in demand for commercial property (i.e. a positive housing gap), together with persistent drops in real estate prices. In order to foster entrepreneurs'demand for real estate, and to reduce to some extent the drop in asset prices, the central bank …nds it optimal to implement a comparatively more expansionary monetary policy, the by-product of which is to create in ‡ation. 16 That is, actual and expected de ‡ation in real estate prices coincide in time with positive consumer price in ‡ation.
Regarding the actual welfare losses, our simple rule is very close to the optimal policy in the case of productivity shocks (table 2) . Indeed, the rule succeeds in reducing the volatility of both the consumption and housing gaps, relative to the other two suboptimal policies. Conditional on credit crunch shocks (table 3), welfare losses under our simple rule are very similar to (though not higher than) those under the other suboptimal rules, although this is not surprising given the small welfare di¤erences between the di¤erent policies in this case. The simple targeting rule does share with the optimal policy the feature of reducing the volatility of the housing gap 15 We also considered a policy that set to zero the weights on the consumption and housing gaps in the quadratic loss function and minimized the resulting 'myopic' loss function. Although such a policy does not deliver a simple expression for the targeting rule either, it can shed light on the extent to which monetary policy should worry about the non-standard stabilization goals. We found that such a policy was much closer to in ‡ation or output gap targeting than to the optimal policy in terms of welfare loss. This strongly suggests that the central bank should not obviate the goals arising from …nancial frictions in the conduct of monetary policy. 16 For brevity of exposition we do not display here the impulse-responses under the optimal simple targeting rule. The latter are available upon request from the authors.
while increasing ‡uctuations in the other goals. Interestingly, the optimal value of the weight coe¢ cient, , is very similar for both shocks, which guarantees that the same rule with a similar coe¢ cient performs well also unconditionally. 17 These results may shed some light on the recent debate as to whether central bankers should pay attention to asset prices when conducting monetary policy. 18 Our analysis suggests that, to the extent that ‡uctuations in the real price of collateralizable assets cause large distortions in the consumption and investment decisions of collateral-constrained agents, then the monetary authority has a rationale for taking into account such asset price ‡uctuations in its policy decisions.
The e¤ects of banking competition
The welfare analysis can also shed some light on the importance of the intensity of competition in the banking sector. 19 To isolate the e¤ects of banking competition on the policy trade-o¤s,
we consider the limiting case of perfect banking competition ( = 0, or n ! 1). In the latter scenario, the steady-state loan rate, R L ss , falls from its baseline value to R D ss = 1= , and the interest rate spread becomes zero. The e¤ect of this structural change on the ‡uctuations of the stabilization goals and the associated welfare losses are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. 17 Indeed, once both shocks are taken into account (with an equal standard deviation of 1%), we …nd an optimal weight coe¢ cient of = 0:214. Welfare losses in this case equal 0.08% of steady-state consumption, which is close to those under the optimal policy (0.06%) and substantially lower than those under in ‡ation or output gap targeting (0.15% and 0.14%, respectively). 18 See for instance Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Cecchetti et al. (2003) for opposing views on this issue. 19 Andrés and Arce (2008) …nd that variations in the level of banking competition have a moderate e¤ect on the short term impulse response dynamics of the main variables, but a sizeable one in the medium term, due to the interaction between lending spreads and persistent net worth e¤ects. Conditional on productivity shocks (table 4) , the policy trade-o¤s clearly worsen when the banking industry is more competitive. For both in ‡ation and output-gap targeting, all stabilization goals other than the one being targeted become more volatile. As a result, average welfare losses increase. Regarding the optimal policy, the increase in in ‡ation and outputgap volatility is partially o¤set by smaller ‡uctuations in the consumption and housing gaps. However, the large weights of the former two goals in the loss function (91:2% and 7:9%, respectively) imply an increase in average welfare loss. This increase is small however. The same can be said about the simple targeting rule based on in ‡ation and real estate prices, which remains very close to the optimal policy in terms of welfare loss. We conclude that, conditional on productivity shocks, the transit to perfect banking competition makes the policy trade-o¤s more severe, but especially so for the suboptimal policy rules.
To understand these results, it is helpful to consider the steady-state e¤ects of an increase in banking competition. We start by de…ning the leverage ratio as the fraction of borrowers'asset holdings that are …nanced with debt, b t = p b ss . Therefore, the increase in the steady-state leverage ratio ampli…es the e¤ect of ‡uctuations in real estate prices on entrepreneur consumption. Since household consumption is not a¤ected by collateral constraints, the increased volatility of entrepreneur consumption carries over to the consumption gap. As we have seen, this has a direct negative e¤ect on welfare, but it also worsens the output-in ‡ation trade-o¤ (by causing larger shifts in the Phillips curve) and ampli…es the distortions in the distribution of real estate through its e¤ects on entrepreneurs'stochastic discount factor. Taking all these e¤ects together, we have that the increase in banking competition tends to exacerbate the trade-o¤s of monetary policy and the associated welfare losses. Table 5 shows the e¤ects of stronger banking competition on welfare losses conditional on credit-crunch shocks. The main message from the table is that the volatility of the di¤erent stabilization goals tends to increase but it does so by very small amounts, and in some cases such volatilities actually fall. As a result, the e¤ect on average welfare losses is virtually inexistent. The intuition for this can be found in the behavior of the lending spread. The latter responds countercyclically to credit crunch shocks when banks have market power, thus amplifying the e¤ects on the economy. However, under perfect banking competition lending spreads are zero, and so their amplifying role disappears. As the table makes clear, this basically neutralizes the amplifying e¤ect of the leverage ratio on welfare losses. 
Conclusions
In this paper we provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the optimal conduct of monetary policy in the presence of …nancial frictions, in the form of collateral constraints and a monopolistically competitive banking sector. In our economy consumers are divided into households and entrepreneurs, with di¤erent time preferences. The resulting credit ‡ows are intermediated by banks, which have some monopolistic power in the loans market and set optimal lending rates accordingly. There is only one collateralizable asset, real estate, which also yields utility to households and productive returns to entrepreneurs. The latter face endogenous credit limits that link their borrowing capacity to the expected value of their real estate holdings. We have shown that, under the assumption of steady state e¢ ciency in the welfare-relevant variables and up to a second order approximation, welfare maximization is equivalent to stabilization of four goals: in ‡ation, output gap, the consumption gap between households and entrepreneurs, and the distribution of real estate between both groups (or housing gap). Follow-ing both productivity and credit-crunch shocks (the latter in the form of exogenous changes in collateral requirements), the optimal monetary policy commitment implies a short-run trade-o¤ between stabilization goals. Relative to strict in ‡ation targeting, the optimal policy commitment changes the nominal policy rate more aggressively so as to avoid large ‡uctuations in the consumption and housing gaps, at the cost of inducing ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in in ‡ation and the output gap. The welfare gain of pursuing optimal policies is comparatively larger under productivity-driven ‡uctuations. Credit-crunch shocks have a direct e¤ect both on lending margins and on the collateral value of real estate, such that policies aimed at sustaining entrepreneurs'demand for real estate (and hence at preventing the emergence of large housing gaps) become less e¤ective.
We also …nd that a simple targeting rule that relates current in ‡ation negatively with current and one-period ahead expected changes in real estate prices performs remarkably well in the face of both TFP or …nancial shocks. From a policy perspective, this suggests that, to the extent that ‡uctuations in the price of collateralizable assets cause large distortions in the expenditure decisions of collateral-constrained agents, then the monetary authority has a rationale for taking into account such asset price ‡uctuations in its policy decisions Finally, we have compared the nature of these trade-o¤s under alternative assumptions about the degree of competition in the banking industry. We …nd that, both under optimal and suboptimal policies, welfare losses due to cyclical ‡uctuations are ampli…ed as banking competition increases. This ampli…cation is negligible in …nancially driven (credit-crunch) ‡uctuations, but is substantial if productivity shocks dominate. Key to this di¤erent e¤ect of banking compettion is the interplay between two endogenous mechanisms at work in our model: …nancial leveraging and lending margins. As banking competition increases, entrepreneurs become more leveraged and this ampli…es the response of their net worth (and hence consumption) to asset prices. This latter feature worsens the aforementioned trade-o¤s, especially under suboptimal policy rules, thus making the use of the optimal policy more compelling. The countercyclical response of lending margins, which is naturally stronger in less competitive environments, aggravates the policy trade-o¤s. The …rst mechanism is equally important regardless of the nature of the shocks, whereas the second one is very weak under productivity shocks and signi…cant if credit-crunch shocks are the driving force behind ‡uctuations.
Appendix
The entrepreneur' s consumption decision
Equations (8) and (9) in the text can be combined as follows,
The latter de…nition allows us in turn to write the collateral constraint (equation 6) as
De…ne real net worth, nw t , as the sum of after-tax real pro…ts and beginning-of-period real estate wealth, minus real debt repayments,
where in the …rst equality we have used (7) to substitute for w t l d t and (39) to substitute for b t 1 . We now guess that the entrepreneur consumes a fraction 1 e of her real net worth,
Using (40) and (41) 
At the same time, the de…nition of real net worth and equation (39) Combining the latter with equation (42), we …nally obtain equation (41), which veri…es our guess.
Implementation of the e¢ cient steady state
Equations (1), (7) and (19) in the steady state jointly imply , where is the subsidy rate on the revenue of …nal goods producers. Therefore, steady-state e¢ ciency requires setting the subsidy rate to
On the other hand, the steady-state counterpart of equation (10) (9) and (8) 
where we have used the fact thatĥ 
Using (54) and (55) 10. Equilibrium in goods markets,ŷ t = !ĉ t + (1 !)ĉ 
